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One free scan finds every outdated or missing driver and matches the right update for your exact hardware.Free scan · exact hardware matchYes—but the useful conclusion is practical, not rhetorical. Cyber-enabled fraud should be treated as transnational organized crime because the people stealing money depend on repeatable infrastructure, laundering channels, recruitment, technical specialists and cross-border protection. The response therefore cannot stop at warning victims. It must disrupt the infrastructure and cash flows, prosecute provable offenses, help victims recover, and reduce the security weaknesses that let criminal networks scale. Executive Order 14390 begins that process; an August 2026 memorandum creates a federally controlled framework for specified cyber operations. Neither document, as currently available, establishes that the promised measures have already reduced losses.
Why the organized-crime label changes the response
A lone scammer and a large cyber-enabled fraud network may use similar messages, but they are not the same policy problem. Industrialized operations can divide labor among people who run call centers, steal credentials, build malware, move money, recruit victims and provide infrastructure. They can shift jurisdictions when one provider or country becomes risky.
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Kyle Hanslovan, Huntress co-founder and CEO, makes that policy argument in his March 16, 2026 CyberScoop opinion article. He calls for action against the system that enables crime, alongside better security inside organizations. That is an argument by the author, not a neutral finding that every cybercrime operation has the same structure.
“The greater question is whether the private sector is willing to help dismantle the infrastructure that allows this industry to thrive,” Hanslovan writes. His affiliation matters: his call for stronger organizational security should be read as his opinion, not as an independent endorsement or a government conclusion.
What the federal government has actually directed
Executive Order 14390, March 6, 2026
The order directs relevant federal officials to review operational, technical, diplomatic and regulatory tools, then submit an action plan identifying transnational criminal organizations involved in scam centers and cybercrime. Its stated approach includes:
- an operational cell within a National Coordination Center;
- federal information sharing and rapid response;
- appropriate use of commercial cybersecurity expertise;
- prosecution of serious, provable offenses;
- resilience support for state and local partners;
- recommendations for a possible victim-restoration program; and
- international engagement.
These are assignments, reviews and required recommendations. The order does not show that every proposed action plan task has been completed or that any particular intervention has produced a measured result.
Presidential memorandum, August 12, 2026
The later memorandum establishes a National Coordination Center program. It authorizes participating companies to conduct specified cyber-surveillance and cyber-effects operations against foreign cyber-enabled transnational criminal organizations. The text places those activities under federal control and oversight and describes them as part of lawful federal investigatory, protective or intelligence operations.
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1Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minute2Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problems3Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesThe memorandum establishes a governance framework, not evidence about how many operations have occurred, which groups were affected or whether losses have fallen. Those implementation questions remain separate from the authority the memorandum creates.
The loss figures show urgency, not a clean year-over-year comparison
| White House publication | Reported figure | What it measures | Important qualification |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 6, 2026 fact sheet | More than $12.5 billion | Consumer-reported cyber-enabled fraud losses in 2024 | The fact sheet is the named source; the reviewed passage does not provide enough methodology to compare it directly with the later figure. |
| August 12, 2026 fact sheet | More than $20.8 billion | Consumer-reported cyber-enabled crime losses in 2025 | The label differs from the March figure, and the reviewed passage does not establish like-for-like measurement. |
The figures should not be presented as a precise increase from one year to the next. They use different labels, and the available passages do not supply enough methodological detail to establish direct comparability. They do, however, indicate the scale of losses reported to the government.
How to disrupt the cybercrime business model
A serious strategy needs more than one target. The following framework separates the part of the criminal economy being attacked, the actor with authority to act and the safeguards that should govern the work.
Rank #3
| Target | Possible intervention | Primary responsibility | Oversight and limits |
|---|---|---|---|
| Criminal infrastructure | Identify and disrupt servers, domains, access brokers, scam-center systems and other enabling services. | Government investigators, foreign partners and private firms supplying technical intelligence. | Use lawful authority, preserve evidence and distinguish criminal infrastructure from legitimate services. |
| Money flows | Trace laundering routes, freeze or seize assets where authorized, and improve information sharing among financial institutions and investigators. | Law enforcement, regulators, financial institutions and international counterparts. | Apply due process, accurate identity checks and channels for correcting mistaken holds. |
| Prosecution | Build cases around serious, provable offenses rather than announcing arrests without evidence that can support charges. | Federal, state, local and foreign prosecutors and investigators. | Jurisdiction, evidentiary standards and defendants’ legal rights remain controlling. |
| Victim recovery | Develop the victim-restoration options contemplated by the March order and coordinate rapid reporting and response. | Federal agencies, financial institutions, platforms, insurers and state and local partners. | Eligibility, funding and administration must be defined; the order calls for recommendations, not an operating program with published results. |
| Organizational defenses | Close basic access, identity, payment and backup weaknesses that make compromise and fraud easier. | Each organization, supported by security providers and government guidance. | Security spending should be proportionate to risk, documented and tested rather than treated as a one-time purchase. |
This is why “shut down the business model” is more useful than promising to eliminate cybercrime. The attainable objective is to make operations harder to run, harder to monetize and easier to investigate while reducing the damage when prevention fails.
What private companies can—and cannot—do
Private firms hold telemetry, payment data, domain information and incident-response expertise that government agencies may not possess at the same speed or scale. Executive Order 14390 specifically contemplates appropriate commercial cybersecurity expertise and federal information sharing.
That cooperation is not a license for companies to conduct unsupervised offensive operations. The August memorandum’s language matters because it places the specified surveillance and cyber-effects program under federal control and oversight. Any private participation must remain within the authority, mission and supervision defined by the government.
For customers and investors, the practical question is whether a provider can document security controls, incident reporting, data-handling limits and a clear escalation path—not whether it uses dramatic “active defense” language.
A practical security baseline for organizations
Hanslovan’s prevention recommendation is broad. Organizations can turn it into a manageable operating checklist:
- Protect sign-ins. Require phishing-resistant or app-based multifactor authentication for email, administrator accounts, remote access and financial systems. Remove dormant accounts and review privileged access.
- Control payment changes. Verify new bank details and urgent transfer requests through a second, known channel. Separate the person requesting a payment from the person approving it.
- Patch and inventory. Keep an accurate list of internet-facing systems, supported software and critical vendors. Prioritize fixes for exposed systems and unsupported products.
- Prepare recovery. Maintain protected, tested backups and an incident plan naming technical, legal, financial, communications and law-enforcement contacts.
- Share quickly after an incident. Preserve logs, report fraudulent transfers to the relevant financial institution immediately, and use applicable government or sector reporting channels. Fast notice can help institutions investigate, even though recovery is never guaranteed.
- Exercise the plan. Test a stolen-credential, ransomware or fraudulent-payment scenario and record who can make decisions when normal systems are unavailable.
These steps are defensive guidance, not evidence that any particular vendor or product will prevent a loss. The available policy documents do not support naming a consumer device or service as a solution.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What households should do with their money
- Turn on multifactor authentication and transaction alerts for banking, email, brokerage and payment accounts.
- Use unique passwords, preferably generated and stored by a reputable password manager, and never reuse an email password for a financial account.
- Pause when a message demands secrecy, urgency, gift cards, cryptocurrency or a change to payment instructions. Contact the institution through the number on a statement or card, not through the message.
- Review statements and account activity regularly. Report unauthorized transactions to the financial institution as soon as possible and keep records of dates, amounts and communications.
- Discuss impersonation scams with relatives who manage family finances, including older adults and teenagers who may be targeted through social platforms.
These habits reduce exposure; they do not transfer responsibility for systemic disruption from government and industry to victims.
How to judge whether the policy is working
The cited documents do not provide outcome data that would justify ranking one approach as most effective. A credible evaluation would track several kinds of evidence rather than one arrest count:
- critical infrastructure and access channels taken offline, with legitimate services protected;
- money intercepted or recovered, with error rates and wrongful account holds disclosed;
- cases that result in provable convictions or other lawful resolutions;
- victims receiving timely, transparent assistance;
- organizations measurably improving identity, payment and recovery controls; and
- cross-border partners sharing actionable information under clear legal agreements.
Publishing those measures, including failures and false positives, would let the public distinguish a functioning disruption program from a sequence of announcements.
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The safeguards are part of the strategy
Cross-border cyber operations can affect innocent infrastructure, personal data and companies that are not criminal participants. Federal control, defined legal authority, oversight, evidence preservation, proportionality and avenues to correct mistakes are therefore operational requirements, not paperwork after the fact.
International coordination is equally important because infrastructure, victims, operators and proceeds may sit in different countries. Cooperation should clarify who can act, what evidence can be shared and how affected people and organizations can seek redress.
Bottom line for policymakers and the public
Washington’s organized-crime framing is a sound policy lens: follow the enablers and the money, not only the person who clicked “send.” Executive Order 14390 sets a broad coordination and planning agenda, while the August memorandum creates a federally supervised framework for specified operations against foreign cyber-enabled criminal organizations. The next test is implementation—lawful disruption, measurable victim support, credible prosecutions and better basic security—rather than assuming that an order or memorandum has already delivered those results.
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