Eni keeps investing in politically risky countries because its strategy treats exploration and production as central to growth, then seeks to spread and manage the risk through a diverse portfolio, partnerships, and links to gas, trading, and power. That is the company’s rationale—not proof that those investments earn better risk-adjusted returns. Its disclosures show the trade-off clearly: access to resources and continuing operations on one side; political uncertainty, sanctions, and payment risk on the other.
What Eni says it gets from the strategy
Eni’s 2026–2030 strategic plan describes exploration and production as a cornerstone of its business. The company argues that an exploration-led portfolio, spread across different geographies and geological plays, can create opportunities to find resources. It says it has discovered more than 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent since 2014, including around 900 million boe in 2025, and expects an average reserve-replacement ratio above 140% over 2026–2030. The discovery totals and future ratio are company disclosures and expectations, not independently verified results or guarantees.
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There is also a financial logic to the way Eni says it manages discoveries. The company describes realizing value early from some finds, working with partners, and connecting upstream production to gas, trading, and power. In principle, those choices can reduce the capital Eni must commit to every opportunity and give it more ways to earn value than selling crude at the wellhead alone. Eni says it uses financial discipline to match capital to differing risk and reward profiles; its published plan does not quantify whether that approach delivers superior returns in any particular country.
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Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minuteDriver Scan →Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problemsFix Now →The company’s full-year 2025 results reported production of 1.73 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and an organic reserve-replacement ratio of 167%. Those are group-wide, company-reported measures. They provide context for Eni’s operating scale, but do not establish that high-risk countries caused the results or that their production is as profitable as production elsewhere.
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How large is the exposure?
Eni’s 2025 annual report says 84% of its proved hydrocarbon reserves were in non-OECD countries at December 31, 2025. Eni notes that some of the operating environments in those countries can be less stable. Non-OECD is a broad category, not a synonym for political risk, but the figure shows that the company’s reserve base is concentrated outside OECD economies.
The same report identifies Libya, Venezuela, and Egypt among the places where Eni is particularly exposed to political risk. The examples are not interchangeable: Libya illustrates an established operating presence amid geopolitical uncertainty; Venezuela adds sanctions and significant receivables; Egypt is identified as a risk area, but the cited disclosures do not offer a comparable current country-level operating picture.
Three country examples, three different risks
| Country | What Eni reports | What the example shows |
|---|---|---|
| Libya | Eni’s 2025 annual report gives production of 162 thousand boe per day, about 10% of group production, and describes continuing activity despite geopolitical risk. Its May 2025 announcement says the company has operated in Libya since 1959 and works through Mellitah Oil and Gas, a 50:50 joint company with Libya’s National Oil Corporation. | A long-standing presence and ongoing operations can coexist with political uncertainty. The joint-venture structure shares ownership, but the cited disclosures do not establish that it removes the operating or country risk. |
| Venezuela | In its first-half 2026 filing, Eni reported nominal credit exposure to PDVSA of $2.7 billion and an impairment provision of about 55%. It said operating conditions were gradually improving and that it had general licenses allowing investment activity and oil marketing, but was not authorized to execute debt swaps. | Prospective or continuing business can be constrained by sanctions and licensing, while unpaid amounts can leave the company exposed to a state-linked counterparty. The filing is a dated company snapshot, not a guarantee of future license scope or payment. |
| Egypt | Eni’s 2025 annual report includes Egypt among areas of particular political risk; the cited material does not provide a comparably detailed current country case. | It is evidence that Eni identifies political exposure there, not a basis for assuming Egypt has Libya’s operating conditions or Venezuela’s sanctions and receivables profile. |
Libya: continuity without certainty
Eni’s May 2025 announcement described three projects sanctioned in 2023: Sabratha Compression, Bouri Gas Utilization, and Bahr Essalam Structures A&E. It said drilling for the latter had begun in April 2025 and forecast Bouri start-up in 2026. That was a schedule forecast in the announcement, not confirmation that start-up occurred. The same announcement reported average equity production of 176,000 boe per day in 2024; the later annual report’s 162-thousand-boe-per-day figure is for 2025, so the two figures refer to different reporting periods.
Eni’s disclosures make Libya a case of sustained activity in a difficult setting, not evidence that the setting is safe. The annual report describes geopolitical risk and uncertainty even as activity areas supported production and development.
Venezuela: operating opportunity alongside financial exposure
Eni’s first-half 2026 filing presents a more direct example of how country risk can reach the balance sheet. The company said conditions were gradually improving following restored political relations between the United States and Venezuela and the lifting of crude export bans. It also reported that licenses permitted certain investment and oil-marketing activity, while debt-swap transactions remained unauthorized. The $2.7 billion nominal PDVSA exposure and approximately 55% impairment provision are Eni’s reported figures for that filing period; they should not be read as a prediction of eventual recovery or as legal guidance about sanctions.
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Eni’s filings identify risks including unstable political, institutional, social, and legal frameworks; conflict or disruption; weak public finances and state counterparties; difficulty obtaining supplies; sanctions; and delays in authorizations. These risks can affect whether a project proceeds, whether production can continue, whether oil can be marketed, and whether counterparties pay. The company’s disclosures establish that it recognizes these exposures, but do not allocate every potential loss among Eni, a government, a joint-venture partner, lenders, or suppliers.
For shareholders, production and reserves are not the same as cash ultimately received. A project can add barrels to reported output while facing delayed approvals, restricted sales, or unpaid bills. The Venezuela impairment provision makes that distinction concrete: a stated credit exposure is not equivalent to collectible cash. In Libya, the continuation of production does not erase the political uncertainty Eni describes.
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What investors can—and cannot—infer
- Supported by Eni’s disclosures: exploration and production are central to its strategy; a large share of proved reserves is in non-OECD countries; and the company identifies political risks in Libya, Venezuela, and Egypt.
- Not established by these figures: that Eni earns higher returns by accepting political risk, that the investments outperform lower-risk projects, or that competitors avoid the same countries. A company-wide production or reserve-replacement result cannot answer those country-level questions.
- Useful to monitor: whether projects reach operation on schedule, whether production can be marketed and paid for, changes in sanctions or authorizations, exposure to state counterparties, and any impairment or other change in reported receivables.
The headline’s “everyone else avoids” framing is not supported by a like-for-like comparison of oil companies. A more precise explanation is that Eni continues to pursue resources and projects in some countries where its own filings recognize elevated political and financial risks. The bet is that exploration opportunities, operating continuity, partnerships, and integrated businesses can make that exposure worthwhile; the company’s public figures do not, by themselves, prove the return.
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