On April 10, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department said its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Indian national Jugwinder Singh Brar and four companies it said he owned or controlled, alleging that their shipping network transported Iranian petroleum. Treasury described ship-to-ship transfers and falsified documents as ways the network concealed the oil’s origin. These are U.S. government allegations, not findings independently adjudicated in the cited announcements.
Who OFAC sanctioned
Treasury said OFAC designated Brar, who it described as based in the United Arab Emirates, for operating in Iran’s petroleum sector. It also designated four companies Treasury said Brar owned or controlled:
- Prime Tankers LLC
- Glory International FZ-LLC
- Global Tankers Private Limited
- B and P Solutions Private Limited
The formal designation entries, including identifying details for listed companies and vessels, appear in OFAC’s April 10, 2025 recent-actions record. Treasury’s announcement said Brar’s companies owned, operated, or managed a fleet of nearly 30 oil and petroleum-product tankers; that is Treasury’s estimate, not an independently verified fleet count. Treasury’s release described many of the vessels as smaller Handysize tankers.
What Treasury alleged the shipping network did
Treasury alleged that tankers in the network transported oil and petroleum products for Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian military. It said the network used high-risk ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in waters off Iraq, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and the Gulf of Oman. According to the department, cargo could then pass to facilitators who blended it with products from other countries and falsified shipping documents to conceal its Iranian origin.
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The release also described smaller vessels loading Iranian oil from shadow-fleet tankers or from smaller commercial and fishing vessels. Treasury said some transfers took days and that vessels sometimes disabled or manipulated automatic identification system (AIS) signals, making their apparent locations differ from their actual positions. These descriptions are allegations attributed to Treasury.
One example in the release involved the vessel NADIYA (IMO 9118745), which Treasury said was operated and managed by Glory International and transported Iranian petroleum in 2023. Treasury also cited a mid-2023 transfer of more than 10,000 metric tons of Iranian petroleum from the NITC-owned DUNE to the GLOBAL ELEGANCE. The figures and vessel details are as stated in Treasury’s account; the release did not give a precise overall value for the shipments, describing them instead as worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
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How the two U.S. actions differed
The April 10 announcement covered two separate actions. The agencies, targets, authorities, and stated grounds were not the same:
| Action | Targets identified | Authority and stated basis |
|---|---|---|
| Treasury/OFAC | Brar and the four companies Treasury said he owned or controlled | Executive Order 13902; Treasury said Brar operated in Iran’s petroleum sector and the companies were owned or controlled by him |
| State Department | Four companies and two vessels, separately identified in the announcement | Executive Order 13846; the department said the companies knowingly engaged in a significant transaction involving Iranian petroleum or petroleum products |
The State Department action should not be conflated with OFAC’s designations of Brar and the four companies. Treasury’s announcement identifies the separate measures and their respective authorities in its April 10 release.
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The case illustrates why sanctions scrutiny can extend beyond the producer or owner of an oil cargo. Tanker operators, managers, brokers, transfer vessels, document handlers, and other counterparties can all be part of the logistics chain. In an April 16, 2025 maritime advisory, OFAC said oil brokers can connect Iranian exporters with foreign buyers and may create or distribute false origin documents, exposing other participants in a transaction to sanctions risk.
For maritime stakeholders, OFAC’s advisory recommends examining cargo documentation and certificates of origin, vessel ownership and voyage history, suspicious STS activity, flag registration, and insurance. It also advises investigating counterparties where evasive practices or links to sanctioned persons are suspected. These are risk-reduction recommendations, not guarantees that a transaction is lawful or free of sanctions exposure.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What the designation means now
The action was announced in 2025; it is not a newly announced 2026 measure. Sanctions designations and licenses can change, so a historical announcement alone does not establish a person’s or company’s current status. OFAC’s Iran sanctions program page describes a framework based on multiple legal authorities. Its current listings may include licenses that apply only to specified parties or transactions; a license listed on that page should not be assumed to cover Brar or the companies in this action. Anyone assessing a present-day transaction should check OFAC’s live Sanctions List Search and the relevant license terms, and seek qualified sanctions counsel where appropriate.
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