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Malware-free attacks use stolen credentials and ordinary system tools to carry out harmful activity without relying on a conventional malware file. They can be difficult to spot because the accounts and tools may also be used for legitimate work. The label is broad: it does not mean an intrusion contains no code, or that malware is never involved.
What are malware-free attacks?
“Malware-free” is commonly used for detections or intrusions that do not depend on conventional malware files. A related term, living off the land (LOTL), describes attackers abusing tools already available in an environment to evade security defenses. The NSA’s February 2024 statement says LOTL techniques can affect on-site, cloud, and hybrid environments. The NSA’s overview of the joint guidance and CrowdStrike’s LOTL explainer describe the technique and its scope.
For example, PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) are legitimate tools that can be misused. An attacker may also use a stolen, valid account. The threat is not a particular tool or malware family; it is malicious activity carried out through identities and capabilities that may have ordinary business uses.
Why are these attacks hard to distinguish from administration?
A valid account accessing a familiar system or an administrator using a built-in tool can look normal in isolation. The warning signs may instead be in the context: whether that user normally accesses the system, whether the activity occurs at an unusual time, or whether a sequence of actions departs from established behavior. Without useful logs, baselines, and monitoring, those differences are harder to identify.
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CrowdStrike’s 2025 threat reporting describes credential abuse, voice phishing, and use of legitimate identities among its observations. These are examples, not an exhaustive list of ways attackers gain access. The practical implication is that defenses focused only on recognizing known malicious files may miss activity carried out through valid accounts and ordinary tools.
What do the recent figures show—and what do they not show?
Figures from security vendors describe what those companies observed or surveyed, not necessarily the experience of every business. CrowdStrike’s 2025 Global Threat Report covers observations from 2024:
| Figure | What it measures | How to interpret it |
|---|---|---|
| 79% malware-free | Share of detections CrowdStrike observed in 2024, as reported in its 2025 Global Threat Report. | It is not an estimate that 79% of all attacks or business breaches worldwide were malware-free. Report summary and discussion of findings. |
| 51 seconds | The fastest recorded eCrime breakout time in CrowdStrike’s 2025 report on 2024 observations. Breakout time means the time from an initially compromised host to another host in the target organization. | This is the fastest observed case, not an average. CrowdStrike’s report discussion. |
| 442% growth | CrowdStrike’s reported growth in vishing between the first and second halves of 2024. | This is the company’s observation, not an independently established measure of all voice phishing. CrowdStrike executive summary. |
CrowdStrike also reported in a 2025 SMB survey release that 93% of respondents said they were knowledgeable about cyber risk, 83% reported having plans, and 36% reported investing in new tools. These are vendor-reported survey results, not a representative census of every small business. They may prompt useful questions about whether a business has the staff and processes to put its plans into practice, but do not establish the readiness of any particular organization. CrowdStrike’s SMB survey release.
How can a business reduce the risk?
Government guidance treats detection and hardening as complementary measures. The NSA’s February 2024 summary of joint guidance recommends logging, authentication controls, privilege restrictions, remote-access audits, behavior baselines, and improved monitoring and alerts. Put the work in this order so that suspicious activity is both harder to carry out and more likely to be visible:
- Collect and review useful logs. Confirm that relevant activity across endpoints, identities, and cloud services is recorded and available to the people responsible for investigating it. Logging without review does not reliably surface suspicious behavior.
- Strengthen authentication. Review how users and administrators authenticate, and use stronger controls supported by your identity provider. A FIDO2 security key is one possible implementation, not a universal requirement; confirm that the identity provider and accounts support it before selecting a device.
- Limit privileges. Restrict ordinary user and administrator permissions to what each role requires. Avoid leaving elevated access available to accounts that do not need it for routine work.
- Inventory and audit remote-access software. Identify what is installed or authorized, who can use it, and whether that access is still needed. Investigate software or access that lacks a clear owner or business purpose.
- Establish behavior baselines. Document what normal access and administration look like across users, systems, and services so that unusual activity has a meaningful point of comparison.
- Tune monitoring and alerts. Use the logs and baselines to raise actionable alerts, then make clear who reviews them and what happens when a concern is confirmed.
These measures work together; buying an endpoint product alone does not replace authentication, least privilege, logging, or a response process. The NSA’s summary of joint-agency recommendations provides the source guidance.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.When should a business seek outside monitoring help?
If your organization cannot review alerts or investigate suspicious activity with its own staff, consider whether a managed detection or threat-hunting service could fill that operational gap. Treat this as a staffing and response decision, not a substitute for basic controls. Ask prospective providers:
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- Which endpoints, identities, cloud services, and hybrid systems are covered?
- What logs are collected, and how long are they retained?
- Who monitors alerts, during which hours, and how quickly are concerns escalated?
- What response actions can the provider take, and which remain your responsibility?
- What integrations, staff effort, and system compatibility are required?
Small-business survey results from one vendor cannot determine whether your organization needs outside help. Base that decision on your own systems, staffing, monitoring coverage, and ability to act on an alert. CrowdStrike discusses managed hunting as a possible category in its LOTL explainer; that vendor-authored material is not an endorsement of a particular provider.
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