In 2012 and 2013, San Francisco and the Obama administration experimented with ways to make public services easier to use: publishing government data, recruiting technologists, testing prototypes and inviting residents to help solve civic problems. The effort was not a single program, and it did not mean government could simply be run like a startup. It was a set of experiments in applying selected technology practices to public work.
What “make government suck less” meant
The phrase came from technology and startup circles. Beneath the blunt slogan was a more specific complaint: residents encountered paper-heavy processes, confusing websites, fragmented databases and difficult applications for permits or benefits. Agencies, meanwhile, could struggle to hire and retain software talent, release usable public data or buy technology through lengthy procurement systems.
These were problems of service design, administrative friction and institutional capacity—not proof that public employees lacked skill or that every government function should be operated as a business. The proposed response was to borrow selected startup practices: build an early version, test it with users, learn quickly and improve it before committing to a large project.
The main initiatives discussed here belong to the Obama administration’s first term, especially 2012–2013. The White House pages documenting them are archived historical records, not current program announcements.
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Why San Francisco became a civic-tech test bed
San Francisco had a dense technology workforce, local companies and developers interested in civic problems, open-data and open-source communities, and a mayor’s office eager to connect the city with outside expertise. Under Mayor Ed Lee, Jay Nath served as chief innovation officer. Nath described the role as making city government more open, responsive and efficient while connecting agencies with developers, entrepreneurs, students and community members. San Francisco was an early, prominent example of this approach, not necessarily the first city to try it. The White House account of San Francisco’s civic innovation work presents the city’s model and its initiatives.
Open data: making public information usable
San Francisco adopted an open-data policy in 2009. Its DataSF initiative made nonconfidential government datasets available to the public, and the city reported that developers had built more than 100 applications involving areas such as public safety, transportation, visualization and environmental protection. That count documents applications, not their commercial success, long-term use or effect on public outcomes.
Publishing a dataset is only a starting point. Its usefulness depends on accuracy, update frequency, documentation, licensing and compatibility with other systems. Privacy matters too: information that seems harmless in one dataset can become identifying when combined with other data. An app built on public information may also be less useful to residents without reliable internet access, people with disabilities or people who need service in another language.
ImproveSF: inviting residents to propose solutions
Launched in April 2012, ImproveSF was a crowdsourcing platform for residents to suggest and develop responses to city problems. The city reported more than 3,000 interactions. A food-access challenge drew more than 100 ideas and 500 comments; other challenges addressed transit efficiency and neighborhood revitalization. These figures describe participation reported by the city, not how representative participants were or how many proposals became funded, implemented services.
The central test for a crowdsourcing platform is what happens after ideas arrive: whether an agency takes ownership, how proposals are evaluated, what gets funded and whether participants can see the outcome. Without those steps, a platform can gather suggestions without giving residents meaningful influence over decisions.
Hackathons and the path from prototype to service
San Francisco also promoted hackathons, where developers and designers worked on defined civic problems. The stated ambition was to move promising projects from a short event into agency pilots and potentially sustainable products. A transit-related application was being piloted to help operators collect real-time data and improve operations, according to the city’s account.
A working demonstration is not yet a dependable public service. Before adoption, an agency may need to resolve security, accessibility, maintenance, data-sharing, procurement and legacy-system integration. It also needs a budget, a responsible owner and a plan for what happens when the original developers move on. Hackathons can shorten the time to a first prototype; they do not remove the work required to run software safely over time.
SF.CITI and a wider civic ecosystem
The San Francisco Citizens Initiative for Technology and Innovation, or SF.CITI, was cited by the Obama administration as a public-private organization intended to mobilize the local technology community for civic purposes. This was an ecosystem model, not simply a city purchasing products from startups: agencies, companies, nonprofits, volunteers, foundations, civic organizations and individual technologists could all take part. The White House account of the Open Government Innovation Partnership describes SF.CITI and the broader collaboration framework.
Code for America connected technologists with government
Code for America acted as an intermediary between public agencies and the technology sector. Its fellowship model placed technologists with local governments for time-limited work; its accelerator supported companies building products for government or civic use. These roles were distinct: fellows were individuals working with governments, startups were businesses developing products, civic hackers contributed technical or design work, and nonprofit organizations coordinated or supported public-interest projects.
In 2012, Code for America announced an inaugural civic-startup accelerator class. Seven companies were selected from more than 235 applicants, with each offered $25,000 and four months of workspace, according to Government Technology’s coverage of the cohort. The model tested whether civic companies could build sustainable offerings, whether agencies could become customers for small technology firms, and whether tools or practices could be reused across jurisdictions. Those were questions the program explored, not proof that the barriers had been overcome.
What the Obama administration tried at the federal level
Washington pursued a parallel strategy: bring technology expertise into government, make data and services easier to use, reduce friction for smaller vendors, and create short-term teams that could prototype solutions. These federal efforts were related to San Francisco’s experiments but were not the same programs, and President Obama did not personally design or manage the city’s projects.
Presidential Innovation Fellows
Announced on August 23, 2012, the Presidential Innovation Fellows program recruited 18 private-sector innovators from nearly 700 applicants for six-month assignments in Washington. Fellows worked on five projects intended to improve services, support entrepreneurs, save money and increase public engagement. The White House announcement describes the first class and its projects.
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Two examples illustrate the goals. Blue Button for America aimed to help people download their own health information electronically. RFP-EZ aimed to make it easier for small, high-growth technology companies to compete for government work. These projects tried to change how government delivered services and bought technology; they were not a wholesale transfer of public responsibilities to private firms.
Open Government Innovation Partnership
Announced in June 2012, the Open Government Innovation Partnership brought together San Francisco, other cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Code for America and related partners. The aim was for cities to commit to principles of transparency, participation and collaboration, then share practices and develop tools that other governments could reuse. Its premise was that residents and outside organizations could contribute expertise while government remained responsible for public decisions and services. The announcement outlines the partnership.
National Day of Civic Hacking
The White House promoted a National Day of Civic Hacking for June 1–2, 2013. Developers, entrepreneurs, technologists and residents were encouraged to work with public data and code on local and national problems; San Francisco was among the participating cities. The format captured the movement’s preferred sequence: government identifies a problem or releases data, outside participants build something, and a promising idea may be considered for adoption. The event itself did not guarantee that a prototype would be maintained or scaled. The White House announcement describes the event.
Startup America was related, but different
Startup America belonged to the administration’s broader entrepreneurship agenda, connecting startups with resources such as capital, mentorship and business services. It overlapped with the belief that entrepreneurial methods could help address public problems, but it was not interchangeable with programs that placed technologists in government, supported civic-tech vendors or invited residents to work with public data. The GovInfo compilation of Obama administration material from 2012 provides context for the entrepreneurship agenda.
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What startups could offer—and what government could not copy
Rapid prototyping, iterative user feedback, small teams, open-source tools and early pilots can help public agencies discover problems before they invest in a large system. But public services differ from many consumer products: people may be unable to opt out, and a failure can affect access to health care, housing, benefits, taxes or other essential functions. Government also has obligations around privacy, accessibility, public records and explaining decisions.
- Accountability: Public agencies must be able to explain decisions and comply with laws and standards that a private beta product may not face.
- Procurement: Competitive bidding, security review, accessibility, data ownership and vendor-risk rules can slow a purchase, but they also help guard against favoritism, waste and lock-in.
- Equity: Digital tools must work for people with disabilities, limited broadband, different language needs and a need for human assistance. A new app does not replace every service channel.
- Maintenance and scale: A prototype must be supported, secured and integrated with existing systems. A tool that works in one department may not fit another agency’s data, laws or workflows.
- Business incentives: Government sales cycles can be slow, budgets constrained and requirements different across jurisdictions. A small vendor may face uncertainty about revenue, and an agency can become dependent on a single provider.
There are alternatives and complements to startup-led experiments: permanent in-house technology teams, public-interest design, university and nonprofit partnerships, open-source software shared across governments, procurement reform, participatory budgeting and co-design with frontline workers and community organizations. Modernization does not require choosing between government expertise and outside talent.
Promises, evidence and open questions
| Promise | Evidence described at the time | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| Open data would spur useful applications | San Francisco reported more than 100 developer-built applications across civic topics in its October 2012 account. | The count does not establish lasting public value, broad access or equitable benefits. |
| Hackathons could produce deployable tools | The city described hackathons and a transit-related application in pilot. | A pilot is not evidence of long-term maintenance, adoption or successful scaling. |
| Startup talent could modernize government | The federal government created a fellowship program, and Code for America supported fellows and civic startups. | The program announcements do not establish how many participants stayed in government or how deeply practices became institutionalized. |
| Small vendors could sell more easily to government | RFP-EZ was designed to address procurement friction; a civic accelerator supported seven companies. | The available program descriptions do not establish how much procurement barriers fell or the long-term commercial results. |
These distinctions matter because contemporary enthusiasm often treated novelty as proof. An announced program, an app count or a successful event is evidence that activity occurred; it is not, by itself, evidence of improved service completion times, cost savings, user satisfaction or fairer outcomes. Public reporting on the initiatives cited here does not settle those questions.
What endured in the idea
The most defensible legacy is not that startups fixed government. It is that the 2012–2013 experiments helped give public-sector modernization a vocabulary centered on digital service design, open data, iterative testing, public-interest technology and cross-sector technical teams. Those methods can make government more responsive when paired with agency ownership, durable funding, privacy protections, accessible service channels and accountability. The startup model is one tool for improving public administration, not a substitute for it.
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