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Industrial espionage is the theft of commercially valuable secrets—often by insiders, consultants, or rival businesses, and sometimes to benefit a foreign government. The cases below range from proven criminal schemes to civil disputes resolved without a finding that every allegation was true. That distinction matters: a settlement is not a conviction, and “industrial espionage” is often a descriptive label rather than the charge in court.
The selection favors cases with notable public impact, strategically important information, international dimensions, or unusually clear legal outcomes. It includes wartime intelligence as well as modern trade-secret cases; they share the pursuit of industrial information but do not all fit the same legal category.
What counts as industrial espionage?
In ordinary usage, industrial espionage means secretly obtaining a company’s confidential commercial or technical information for a competitor or other beneficiary. The target might be a chemical formulation, manufacturing process, plant design, customer list, pricing plan, source code, or product roadmap—not necessarily a finished product or a single “master file.”
The legal distinction depends on the conduct and purpose. In the United States, trade-secret theft intended to benefit another person or company can be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832; economic espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 1831 involves an intent to benefit a foreign government or its agent. Civil misappropriation claims, military intelligence collection, and patent infringement are different matters. Patent infringement does not, by itself, establish that a secret was stolen.
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Likewise, ordinary competition, lawful reverse engineering, and hiring someone who changes jobs are not automatically espionage. The cases below are labeled by their outcomes so allegations are not mistaken for proven facts.
Ten notorious industrial-espionage cases
1. The Duquesne Spy Ring: DuPont plant information in wartime
Status: Historical state-sponsored espionage; conviction. In the 1930s and early 1940s, German agent Fritz Duquesne operated within a wider espionage network in the United States. The FBI’s account says Duquesne claimed to have entered a DuPont plant in Wilmington, Delaware, and supplied photographs and specifications for a new American bomb. He also discussed ways to start fires at industrial plants. This was not simply a company trying to outcompete another: industrial information formed part of a broader effort to collect military and infrastructure intelligence. The FBI’s case history describes how double agent William Sebold and a bugged office helped document the network. Duquesne was convicted and sentenced to 18 years in prison, with a concurrent sentence and fine for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
2. The Coca-Cola document-sale plot
Status: Criminal convictions. In 2006, Coca-Cola employee Joya Williams and two accomplices tried to sell confidential Coca-Cola information to PepsiCo. PepsiCo alerted Coca-Cola rather than use the material; Coca-Cola contacted the FBI. An undercover agent then negotiated to buy documents and materials for $1.5 million, according to the Department of Justice account. The undercover operation and recorded interactions helped expose the attempted sale. Williams received a 96-month sentence, Ibrahim Dimson 60 months, and cooperating defendant Edmund Duhaney 24 months, as described in a DOJ case discussion.
The case is often retold as an attempt to sell Coca-Cola’s famous formula. The official account supports a more careful description: confidential company information was offered for sale. It does not establish that the secret recipe itself was the material in question.
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Status: Corporate trade-secret controversy; civil settlement. José Ignacio López de Arriortúa left General Motors for Volkswagen in 1993. GM accused López and colleagues of taking confidential documents and proprietary manufacturing information. The dispute led to criminal and civil investigations in the United States and Germany, but it should not be described as a criminal conviction of Volkswagen for stealing GM’s secrets. Widely reported settlement terms included a $100 million payment to GM and an agreement by Volkswagen to buy at least $1 billion in GM parts over seven years. The settlement resolved the dispute; it did not necessarily admit every allegation. The episode remains a vivid example of the risks that arise when senior employees move between competitors with access to sensitive operational information.
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4. Kolon Industries and DuPont’s Kevlar technology
Status: Corporate guilty plea; related individual pleas. DuPont’s Kevlar manufacturing know-how was at the center of a case involving Kolon Industries and its competing para-aramid fiber, Heracron. Prosecutors said Kolon targeted current and former DuPont and Teijin employees, hiring former staff as consultants and seeking confidential technical information. The alleged material included process documents, polymerization information, costs, and customer data. A DOJ indictment summary describes the alleged recruitment and efforts to obtain information from current employees, as well as attempts by some Kolon personnel to delete emails and files after litigation began: the indictment announcement.
Kolon pleaded guilty in 2015 and was ordered to pay $85 million in criminal fines and $275 million in restitution, totaling $360 million, according to the DOJ plea announcement. Former DuPont employees also pleaded guilty or cooperated. The FBI later said DuPont helped organize more than a million pages of documents and hundreds of hours of recordings for the investigation: FBI account. The case shows how an investigation can depend on people, document evidence, and a victim company’s ability to explain complex technical records.
5. DuPont’s titanium-dioxide process and Chinese companies
Status: Economic-espionage convictions. This case concerned DuPont’s chloride-route process for producing titanium dioxide (TiO₂), a white pigment used in paint, plastics, and paper. Prosecutors described the process as cleaner and more efficient than the sulfate process then common in China. The alleged plan involved Walter and Christina Liew and others obtaining DuPont secrets for use by Chinese companies, including Pangang Group companies controlled by the Chinese government. Prosecutors said the Liews’ engineering company entered contracts worth more than $20 million and that the technology was intended to help build a large TiO₂ facility. Those allegations and the technology are set out in the DOJ charging announcement.
Walter Liew, Robert Maegerle, and USA Performance Technology were found guilty. The Department of Justice described the verdict as the first federal jury conviction under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996: DOJ verdict announcement. Unlike a case involving a foreign commercial rival alone, this prosecution squarely raised the question of whether stolen technology was intended to benefit state-controlled companies.
6. Former Dow scientist David Liou and chemical-process secrets
Status: Criminal conviction and sentence. Wen Chyu Liu, also known as David W. Liou, was a former Dow Chemical research scientist. Prosecutors said he conspired with current and former Dow employees at facilities in Plaquemine, Louisiana, and Stade, Germany, to obtain information about valuable chemical processes and products. The information was used to develop and market process-design packages to Chinese companies. The DOJ’s PRO IP Act report discusses the case, and a DOJ case summary says Liu was sentenced to 60 months in 2012 for stealing Dow trade secrets, selling them to companies in China, and committing perjury.
The case illustrates why a process-design package can be as commercially valuable as a blueprint or source code: it may compress years of research, plant testing, and failed experiments into information another company can use.
7. Motorola engineer Hanjuan Jin
Status: Trade-secret and national-security prosecution with contested issues. The Motorola case involving former engineer Hanjuan Jin drew attention to the difficult boundary between an employee possessing work documents, stealing trade secrets, and carrying export-controlled technical information. It also involved allegations about plans to support a competing Chinese telecommunications venture. These categories are not interchangeable: a technical document can raise export-control or national-security concerns without proving that a foreign government directed its removal, and a foreign business connection alone does not establish economic espionage. The case is notable for how an employee’s departure with technical material can trigger both corporate and counterintelligence scrutiny, but it should not be reduced to a simple claim that every allegation of espionage was proven.
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8. Waymo and Uber’s autonomous-driving dispute
Status: Trade-secret litigation resolved by settlement; not a criminal conviction of Uber. Anthony Levandowski worked on Google’s self-driving project, later known as Waymo. Waymo alleged that he downloaded confidential files before leaving, then used them in connection with his venture, which Uber later acquired. The dispute raised questions central to technology acquisitions: what files were taken, whether they were used, what the acquiring company knew, and what due diligence should uncover. The companies settled, with Uber providing compensation to Waymo and agreeing to safeguards around Waymo’s confidential information. A settlement does not establish that Uber committed criminal industrial espionage or resolve every allegation as a judicial finding.
9. Starwood and Hilton’s luxury-hotel plans
Status: Alleged trade-secret misappropriation; settlement. Starwood accused former executives who joined Hilton of taking confidential information related to Starwood’s luxury hotel brands and using it to speed Hilton’s competing launch. The allegations reportedly concerned electronic files, brand strategy, development plans, and other confidential material. Hilton ultimately agreed to a settlement and compliance obligations. The dispute is a reminder that trade secrets are not confined to laboratories and factories: a company’s expansion strategy, brand architecture, and operating plans may also be confidential commercial assets. Because the case ended in settlement, Starwood’s allegations should not be recast as findings that every claimed act occurred.
10. Coca-Cola chemist Xiaorong You and BPA-free can coatings
Status: Criminal convictions and sentence. This case involved formulations for BPA-free coatings used inside beverage cans and other food containers. Such coatings help prevent corrosion and limit interaction between the container and its contents. Xiaorong You worked at Coca-Cola and later Eastman Chemical, with access to confidential information belonging to multiple companies. Prosecutors said she stole formulations to help establish a BPA-free coating business in China, and valued the development of the trade secrets at nearly $120 million. Trial evidence included claims about Chinese government grants and a Thousand Talents Program award; those claims should be attributed to prosecutors and the trial evidence rather than generalized to every foreign research partnership. The conviction announcement is at the DOJ.
You was convicted in 2021 of conspiracy, economic espionage, trade-secret theft, and wire fraud. She was sentenced to 168 months in prison, according to the DOJ sentencing announcement. The case shows how a single specialist may have access to valuable secrets across several employers and how environmental or regulatory innovation can itself be a target.
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What these cases reveal about how industrial espionage works
Insiders and consultants can matter more than malware
Several cases relied on employees, former employees, or consultants who knew where valuable information lived and how to interpret it. A departing employee can move more than files: they carry practical knowledge of processes, suppliers, tolerances, and the history behind technical decisions. That does not make employee mobility unlawful; the critical questions are whether confidential information was improperly obtained or used and what evidence supports that claim.
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The most valuable secrets may be invisible to consumers
Kevlar production methods, TiO₂ manufacturing, chemical-process packages, and can-coating formulations do not have the recognition of a famous recipe or gadget. Yet confidential process knowledge can save a rival time, expense, and failed trials. Trade secrets can also include customer and cost information, business plans, and product strategy—assets whose value is not apparent from a product’s exterior.
Proof requires more than finding a document
Possession of a file does not, by itself, prove that a competitor used it or that it enabled a rival product. Investigators may need to establish who accessed information, how it moved, whether it was secret and valuable, and what the recipient did with it. Forensic analysis, recorded conversations, financial records, technical comparisons, and cooperation from the victim company can all help build a case. The Kolon investigation, for example, required DuPont to organize a huge volume of documents and recordings for investigators.
Legal outcomes change what can responsibly be said
A guilty plea or conviction supports stronger statements about proven conduct than an indictment or civil complaint. A settlement resolves a dispute but is not necessarily an admission of liability. That is why the Lopez, Waymo–Uber, and Starwood–Hilton disputes belong in the history of corporate secrecy controversies, but should not be described as criminal convictions for industrial espionage.
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The cases point to practical controls, not a single piece of security software. Organizations handling sensitive technical or commercial information can:
- Limit access to people who need the information and separate especially sensitive research from routine collaboration.
- Classify confidential material and use permissions, audit logs, and monitoring to identify unusual bulk downloads or sharing.
- Set clear terms for consultants, suppliers, and research partners, including what they may access, retain, and return.
- Use consistent offboarding procedures, revoke access promptly, preserve relevant records, and obtain clear attestations about company material.
- Maintain an incident-response plan that brings together security, legal, human resources, and technical experts when suspected theft occurs.
These controls cannot prevent every disclosure: a person can still reveal knowledge verbally or photograph a screen. They do make access more deliberate and help an organization detect and investigate misuse. In a suspected incident, preserving evidence and obtaining legal advice are more useful than deleting files or confronting a potential recipient without a plan.
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