The Post Office said an independent investigation would examine whether the current version of its Horizon accounting system records data reliably and handles branch discrepancies properly. Computer Weekly reported on 20 June 2025 that Kroll was conducting the review and that it was expected in autumn 2025. As of 18 August 2026, no public final report or verified findings from that specific current-Horizon review can be identified in the available authoritative record.
That is different from Kroll’s September 2024 report on the older Capture software. Capture and Horizon are separate systems, and the Capture findings do not establish that the current Horizon system is safe, unsafe or unchanged.
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What was announced in 2025?
The June 2025 report described a review in progress, not a completed audit or a new inquiry report. Kroll was reported to be the independent investigator. The Post Office said the work would examine two broad areas: the integrity of data held in Horizon, and the processes used to identify and resolve discrepancies. Completion was expected in autumn 2025, which was a forecast rather than a confirmed delivery date.
A technical review is not a court ruling. It could assess whether records and controls work as intended, but it would not by itself decide legal responsibility for historical prosecutions or whether individual convictions are safe.
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Computer Weekly’s 20 June 2025 report is the published source for the announcement, Kroll’s role and the stated timetable.
What was the review supposed to test?
“Integrity” in an accounting system means more than asking whether software contains bugs. A useful investigation would need to test whether:
- transaction records are complete, consistent and protected from unexplained alteration;
- adjustments, corrections and reversals leave an auditable trail;
- a branch-level discrepancy can be independently reproduced from underlying records;
- the system distinguishes a genuine cash loss from a connectivity, infrastructure, integration or processing failure;
- postmasters receive enough information to challenge an alleged shortfall; and
- connected platforms, including back-office systems, can create or alter the appearance of a discrepancy.
Evidence given to the Horizon Inquiry by a Fujitsu executive stressed that an incident described as a “Horizon” problem might involve connected systems, infrastructure or connectivity. That is a qualification about the scope of diagnosis, not an exoneration of Horizon.
Why did the review matter?
Horizon has been used in branches since 1999 and was central to the scandal in which the Post Office treated apparent accounting shortfalls as evidence against many subpostmasters. People were pursued for money, dismissed, made bankrupt or prosecuted. Litigation and the statutory inquiry established that Horizon evidence could not safely be treated as proof of postmaster wrongdoing.
The proposed review also followed continuing concerns from people still operating branches. Computer Weekly reported survey results presented to the inquiry in September 2024: 57% of surveyed current postmasters said they had experienced unexplained shortfalls, while 92% reported a Horizon-related issue in the previous 12 months. Screen freezes and lost connectivity were among the common problems, and about three-quarters said they had either used their own money to cover discrepancies or resolved an issue themselves.
Those are survey findings, not proof that every incident was caused by Horizon software. They do, however, explain why a transparent examination of the present system and the discrepancy process was important.
Systems that must not be confused
| System or category | Relevance |
|---|---|
| Current Horizon | The system described as the subject of the proposed Kroll integrity review. |
| Earlier Horizon versions | Versions associated with the historical scandal; they should not automatically be assumed identical to the current architecture. |
| Capture | A separate older accounting system. Kroll’s report, published 30 September 2024, found a reasonable likelihood that Capture could have created shortfalls. |
| Connected systems and infrastructure | Networks, hardware, data centres, interfaces and back-office platforms may affect how transactions or discrepancies appear. |
| Replacement platform | The future system intended eventually to end reliance on Horizon. |
The Post Office’s official FAQ describes the separate Capture investigation. It did not assess the current Horizon system and did not determine whether any convictions were unsafe.
Why the replacement timetable increases the stakes
The Post Office was seeking an off-the-shelf replacement, but the June 2025 reporting said the programme could take until 2033. Fujitsu’s operational involvement was expected to end earlier, creating a need for an interim supplier or transition arrangement. Later reporting said replacement plans were still delayed in 2026 (Computer Weekly, 30 July 2026).
A prolonged transition raises practical questions:
- How will data be migrated and checked?
- Will branches move in phases, and how will parallel systems be reconciled?
- Who will operate Horizon between Fujitsu’s exit and the replacement’s full deployment?
- What safeguards will apply when a discrepancy is reported?
- Can a postmaster obtain and challenge the underlying evidence before money is demanded?
The estimate of 2033 is a programme forecast, not a guaranteed delivery date. The longer Horizon remains in operation, the more important it is to establish what the current system can and cannot demonstrate.
What is known about the review’s status?
| Publicly supported | Not publicly verified |
|---|---|
| The review was reported on 20 June 2025. | A final report from this specific current-Horizon Kroll review. |
| Kroll was reported to be conducting it. | Its conclusions about reliability or safety. |
| The stated scope covered Horizon data integrity and discrepancy identification and resolution. | Completion in autumn 2025; that was an expected date. |
| The work mattered while Horizon remained in service. | Recommendations, remedial actions or confirmation that findings were supplied to Parliament or the Horizon Inquiry. |
Accordingly, the careful formulation is that no public findings could be verified as of 18 August 2026. That is not proof that the review was never completed. Possible explanations for a non-public document—such as confidentiality, security or legal privilege—should not be asserted without evidence.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What would a credible final report need to disclose?
A meaningful report should identify:
- the exact Horizon version, modules and interfaces examined;
- which connected systems, networks and telecommunications were included or excluded;
- the branch sample and period of data tested;
- testing methods and whether investigators could reproduce discrepancies independently;
- known defects, outages, data-loss risks and reconciliation exceptions;
- access provided to source code, logs, audit trails and incident records;
- any limits caused by confidentiality or legal privilege;
- recommendations, named owners and implementation deadlines; and
- when progress and a postmaster-facing explanation will be published.
Without that information, saying that Horizon has “integrity” would be too vague to reassure users or the public.
What current postmasters can record when a discrepancy occurs
This is practical record-keeping guidance, not legal advice. Retain:
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- daily transaction, cash and reconciliation records;
- incident numbers and support-call references;
- dates and times of outages, freezes or connectivity failures;
- all correspondence disputing a discrepancy;
- evidence of personal funds used to cover an alleged shortfall; and
- independent witness accounts where available.
Keeping records does not itself prove the cause of a loss or guarantee compensation, but it preserves contemporaneous evidence for any investigation or dispute.
Questions still requiring answers
- Post Office: Was the current-Horizon review completed, and what was its final publication status?
- Kroll: What deliverable was agreed, and was a report issued?
- Department for Business and Trade: Has government reviewed the conclusions?
- Horizon Inquiry: Was the report provided to the statutory inquiry?
- Postmaster representatives: Were they consulted or shown the findings?
The Horizon Inquiry publication page, the House of Commons Business and Trade Committee report of 13 March 2026 and 2025 redress progress reports are relevant official records, but they should not be treated as substitutes for a current-Horizon Kroll report.
The bottom line
The promised review was important because Horizon remained operational after a scandal involving unreliable computer evidence. The public record verifies its reported remit and expected timetable, but not a published set of findings. Until the methodology, scope and conclusions are confirmed, it is responsible neither to declare the current system safe nor to infer that it repeats every defect associated with historical versions.
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