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1Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minute2Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problems3Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesEconomist Keyu Jin’s central argument is that China is unlikely to abandon the global economy under pressure from tariffs, technology controls and supply-chain rivalry. In her account, Beijing is pursuing two goals at once: staying connected to international markets while reducing vulnerability in strategically important technologies and inputs. That is not proof that China is benign, that export controls will fail, or that engagement guarantees security. It is a framework for judging where interdependence remains useful, where dependence creates leverage and how governments and companies can reduce risk without assuming total separation is possible.
Jin made this case in an interview with EE Times published March 13, 2025, after Mobile World Congress 2025. The interview addresses economics, industrial capacity and technology policy; it is not a complete account of China’s military, Taiwan or diplomatic strategy.
Who is Keyu Jin?
Jin is an economist associated with the London School of Economics and Political Science. Born and raised in Beijing, she studied in the United States and holds undergraduate, master’s and doctoral degrees from Harvard. Her work focuses on China’s political economy, growth model, innovation and global role. Her book, The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism, was published by Viking on May 16, 2023; publisher details are available from Penguin Random House, while LSE provides an academic profile and event page.
That background gives Jin experience of both Chinese and Western institutions, but it does not make her representative of the Chinese government or Chinese public opinion. Her claims should be read as an economist’s interpretation and policy argument, not as an official doctrine.
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Jin’s argument in five points
- China still values global supply chains. Manufacturers need overseas customers, imported energy and commodities, equipment, software and selected advanced technologies.
- Resilience does not require autarky. China can seek domestic capability in sensitive areas while remaining commercially open elsewhere.
- De-risking should mean diversification. Replacing dependence on China with dependence on the United States, or any single country, creates another vulnerability.
- Technology controls have two time horizons. Restrictions can hurt Chinese firms immediately but may also increase incentives for domestic substitution and alternative ecosystems.
- Europe should preserve room to engage both sides. Jin favors pragmatic diversification rather than treating every economic decision as a demand to join one bloc.
What “a fractured world” means
“Fractured world” is an editorial description, not a formal Chinese policy label. It refers to U.S.-China strategic competition, tariffs, export controls, supply-chain diversification and rivalry over semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, logistics and industrial capacity.
Jin’s key observation is that external openness and internal resilience are not opposites. A country can seek foreign markets and investment while reducing exposure to foreign chokepoints. The practical question is which connections China wants to preserve, which dependencies it wants to replace and when political or security goals may override commercial efficiency.
Why global supply chains remain important to China
In the EE Times interview, Jin said China was puzzled by what she viewed as a U.S. turn toward protectionism and inward-looking policies. She described Chinese efforts to preserve openness, including tariff measures involving developing countries and other trading partners; those policy details are her account in the interview and should not be treated as a complete inventory of current Chinese trade policy.
Global participation gives Chinese firms scale, customers, technical feedback and access to inputs that cannot be produced domestically at comparable cost or quality. It also supports employment and tax revenue across a manufacturing system that remains deeply integrated with international production networks.
Openness, however, does not imply political neutrality. A state can welcome trade while using market access, industrial subsidies, standards or export licensing to pursue strategic goals. The existence of commercial ties therefore cannot by itself settle whether a particular dependency is safe.
Is China trying to weaponize supply-chain dependence?
Jin argues that deliberately weaponizing China’s comparative advantages would be a “double-edged sword.” Coercive restrictions could encourage customers to find substitutes and reduce their exposure to Chinese suppliers. Her point is about incentives, not a guarantee of future conduct.
Four concepts should be kept separate:
- Commercial dependence: reliance created by cost, scale or efficiency.
- Structural dependence: difficulty replacing a supplier because alternatives do not exist at comparable scale.
- Political leverage: the ability to delay, restrict or condition access.
- Coercion: deliberate use of economic restrictions to change another government’s behavior.
China may prefer to remain central to supply chains and still use leverage selectively when leaders judge a political or security objective more important than lost business. The risk assessment must therefore examine capabilities, incentives and past behavior rather than stated intentions alone. Leverage can also be latent: the ability to interrupt supply may influence decisions even when no interruption occurs.
De-risking is not the same as decoupling
Jin’s preferred approach is diversification rather than comprehensive separation. The terms describe different strategies:
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| Strategy | Meaning | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Decoupling | Attempting to separate economic systems or supply chains | Maximum reduction in exposure, but high cost and limited feasibility |
| De-risking | Reducing specific vulnerabilities while retaining useful trade and investment | More targeted, but leaves some interdependence |
| Diversification | Spreading suppliers, production, customers and infrastructure across locations | Improves redundancy but can duplicate capacity and raise prices |
| Reshoring | Bringing production back domestically | Greater control, usually with higher labor and capital costs |
| Friend-shoring | Moving activity toward politically aligned countries | May improve security while narrowing the supplier pool |
| China-plus-one | Keeping Chinese production while adding another base | Reduces concentration without eliminating Chinese inputs |
A company can add capacity in Vietnam, Mexico or India and still depend on Chinese machinery, chemicals, components or minerals. Assembly location is not the same as origin of every critical input.
Technology controls: denial today, substitution tomorrow?
Jin acknowledged short-term harm from restrictions on advanced chips and technology access but said the long-term result is uncertain. The semiconductor system includes multiple layers:
- Chip design
- Electronic-design-automation software
- Manufacturing equipment and advanced lithography
- Materials and specialty chemicals
- Fabrication
- Memory
- Packaging and testing
- Power semiconductors
- Downstream demand from AI, electric vehicles, telecommunications and industrial equipment
A restriction at one sensitive layer can slow frontier production without controlling the entire ecosystem. Chinese firms may respond through domestic substitution, alternative designs, older-node manufacturing, state funding, supply-chain coordination and large domestic demand. Proximity between chip producers and downstream AI or autonomous-vehicle companies can also shorten feedback cycles, a strength Jin emphasized in the interview.
The opposing mechanism is durable denial. Leading-edge equipment can depend on concentrated suppliers, tacit engineering knowledge and materials that are difficult to reproduce. Controls can therefore create bottlenecks that persist even when they increase Chinese investment. Both effects can occur: restrictions may slow access to frontier capability while accelerating work on substitutes. Their balance depends on the technology, allied enforcement, available alternatives and the time horizon.
China’s industrial ecosystem: strength and limits
Industrial power is broader than ownership of a single advanced technology. Jin’s analysis highlights dense supplier networks, skilled labor, logistics, financing, infrastructure and a domestic market large enough to support rapid experimentation and mass production.
That advantage has limits. Scale does not guarantee frontier leadership. Subsidies can create overcapacity and weak returns; property-sector weakness, high debt, demographic aging, youth employment problems and soft household consumption can reduce domestic demand. Foreign intellectual property, equipment and materials may remain indispensable in specific fields. Jin’s own broader commentary argues that China’s growth model needs to change to support younger generations and a new source of demand; see her discussion at her official site.
Critical minerals and logistics in developing countries
EE Times presents Chinese investment in logistics and access to critical minerals in developing countries as part of a forward-looking effort to secure resources for technological development. Such activity can be commercial, strategic or both.
- Resource and transport projects can reduce supply risk for Chinese manufacturers.
- Financing and infrastructure can create durable commercial relationships and diplomatic influence.
- Host countries may gain roads, ports or processing capacity but also face debt, environmental, labor or dependence concerns.
- Other investors, including U.S., European and Japanese firms, compete for the same assets and partnerships.
It is too broad to classify every overseas Chinese investment as military policy, just as it is too broad to treat commercial investment as strategically neutral.
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Why Europe occupies the hardest middle position
Jin sees Europe as able to diversify economic relationships and work with both Washington and Beijing. The principle is attractive, but implementation differs by sector.
Reasons to maintain economic engagement
- Access to a major consumer and industrial market.
- Commercial opportunities in automotive, machinery, consumer goods, luxury and technology.
- Cooperation on issues that cross borders.
- Less exposure to dependence on the U.S. market or policy.
Reasons to reduce exposure
- National-security and critical-infrastructure risks.
- Potential coercive trade measures.
- Dependence on Chinese inputs and concerns about subsidies, market access and intellectual property.
- Data-security and technology-transfer concerns.
- Defense and NATO obligations that make some alignment unavoidable.
Europe can diversify commercial relationships while coordinating with Washington on defense, sensitive exports, data and infrastructure. “Work with both” is therefore a sector-by-sector policy, not a promise of complete strategic neutrality. EU institutions, member-state governments, businesses and security agencies do not always share the same priorities.
Why Jin says Western analysts misread China
Jin’s wider work argues that analysts often assume China must follow a Western path. LSE describes her book as a holistic interpretation grounded in China’s history and political economy; her presentation is available through the LSE Player.
Her concrete warnings include confusing political centralization with total economic centralization, understating the role of local governments and private firms, assuming that integration inevitably produces political convergence, and swinging between predictions of imminent collapse and inevitable dominance. Historical and cultural context is useful only when connected to observable institutions, incentives and outcomes. It cannot substitute for evidence about coercion, investment, productivity or technology.
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Strengths
- It treats China as an active strategist rather than a passive target of foreign policy.
- It explains why openness and self-reliance can coexist.
- It recognizes that comprehensive decoupling is costly and that controls can have unintended effects.
- It focuses on industrial ecosystems, not only headline technologies.
Limitations
- Commercial incentives may lose to political or security objectives.
- China may accept economic costs to gain leverage in a crisis.
- Frontier bottlenecks can be harder to overcome than broad manufacturing gaps.
- Engagement can create asymmetric dependence even when trade is mutually profitable.
- The interview does not establish a formal Chinese strategy or predict military and Taiwan outcomes.
Practical implications for policymakers, companies and investors
For governments
- Define the specific vulnerability before imposing a broad restriction.
- Separate military-relevant technologies from ordinary commerce where possible.
- Build redundant suppliers and stockpiles without assuming total separation is affordable.
- Measure both immediate denial effects and incentives for long-term substitution.
For companies
- Map tier-two and tier-three suppliers, not just the final assembler.
- Identify Chinese minerals, components, software and machinery embedded in supposedly diversified products.
- Stress-test export-control, sanctions and shipping-disruption scenarios.
- Use China-plus-one as concentration reduction, not as proof of independence.
For analysts and investors
- Separate Jin’s assessment from documented policy and from your own inference.
- Track capabilities and incentives separately from rhetoric.
- Distinguish short-term production losses from long-term innovation responses.
- Watch domestic Chinese demand, debt, demographics and private-sector confidence alongside external pressure.
The central judgment
Jin’s argument is not that China is harmless or that containment is never justified. It is that a strategy designed to stop China’s economic participation altogether may be unrealistic, expensive and potentially self-defeating. China can remain globally connected while hardening selected domestic capabilities; other countries can reduce dangerous dependencies without trying to erase every commercial link. The policy challenge is deciding which connections create resilience and which create unacceptable leverage.
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