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No: the available figures do not demonstrate that China has reached 40% self-sufficiency across its semiconductor market. The clearest directly comparable estimate in the cited evidence is 16.6% in 2020. A 2025 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission assessment put local sourcing at about 30% by the end of 2025, but that was a projection, not a measured final result. China has made faster gains in mature and foundational chips than in advanced chipmaking, so the answer changes with the definition of “self-sufficient.”
What does “40% chip self-sufficiency” mean?
It means little without a denominator and a rule for what counts as domestic. A percentage might compare Chinese-made chips with all chips consumed in China, or it might refer only to a chip category, such as foundational chips. “Made in China” can mean fabricated in mainland China, while “Chinese” can mean produced by a Chinese-owned company; those are not necessarily the same thing.
The 40% figure is also easy to confuse with two different policy targets. The Made in China 2025 policy set a broad 40% localization milestone for core components and key materials by 2020, rising to 70% by 2025. Separately, semiconductor evaluations tracked a 50% domestic-market-share goal for semiconductors by 2020. Neither target, on its own, establishes that China met a 40% whole-market semiconductor self-sufficiency rate.
What do the available figures show?
The figures below describe different things. They should not be combined into a single trend line: self-sufficiency, local sourcing, global capacity share and production output have different denominators.
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| Figure | What it measures | How to read it |
|---|---|---|
| 16.6% in 2020 | China’s semiconductor self-sufficiency, as reported by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2025 | The clearest directly comparable whole-market self-sufficiency estimate in the available figures. It is below 40%. |
| About 30% by the end of 2025 | The Commission’s assessment of the share of China’s chips expected to be sourced from local manufacturers | A projection, not a confirmed end-of-2025 measurement. Its sourcing definition should not be assumed to match the 2020 self-sufficiency estimate. |
| 33% in 2023, up from 19% in 2015 | China’s share of global foundational-node logic wafer capacity, for chips defined as 28 nanometers and larger, in the Commission’s 2025 report | A global capacity share for a particular category—not the share of all chips consumed in China supplied domestically. |
| 4,843 hundred-million units in 2025, up from 2,614 in 2020 | China’s integrated-circuit output, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2026 | Output rose from 261.4 billion units to 484.3 billion units. Production volume does not show what share of domestic demand was met by Chinese suppliers. |
| 26.7% growth in 2025 | Growth in integrated-circuit manufacturing value added, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2026 | A growth statistic, not a self-sufficiency percentage. |
Where China is making the fastest progress
The strongest gains are in mature and foundational chips, used widely across products such as vehicles, industrial equipment and consumer electronics. The Commission reported that China’s share of global foundational-node logic wafer capacity rose from 19% in 2015 to 33% in 2023. It also said China’s mature-node capacity grew more than four times faster than global demand from 2015 to 2023.
That expansion can make supplies of some chips more resilient and reduce reliance on overseas foundries for those categories. It does not establish independence across the semiconductor supply chain or prove that domestic firms supply 40% of all chips consumed in China. Capacity is not the same as production, and production is not the same as domestic demand served.
The Commission projected that China-based firms could account for nearly half of new mature-node capacity over the following three to five years. That projection concerns new capacity, not a share of China’s chip consumption or an already achieved self-sufficiency rate.
Why advanced-chip independence remains harder
Making more chips at mature nodes does not automatically solve the constraints on leading-edge logic or on the equipment needed to manufacture chips. The Commission reported that China-based equipment makers met only 9.6% of domestic demand for 20–14-nanometer chipmaking equipment in 2023. That is an upstream equipment measure, not a percentage of chips made domestically, but it illustrates a supply-chain bottleneck.
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The Commission also cited analysts who assessed China as at least two years behind the cutting edge and said U.S. and partner export controls were likely to delay advanced-chip development. That assessment should not be converted into a fixed forecast: the gap can vary by technology and change over time. It does, however, underline why mature-node capacity gains are not evidence of leading-edge self-sufficiency.
Foundry rankings offer another useful but limited signal. The Commission, citing Counterpoint data, reported that SMIC overtook GlobalFoundries in the first quarter of 2024 to become the world’s third-largest foundry by revenue, with a 6% global revenue share. That is a company ranking and global revenue measure—not China’s share of its own chip demand.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Does investment make 40% inevitable?
The Commission reported more than $150 billion in state-led semiconductor investment by 2024, comparing that amount with roughly three times the funding earmarked for U.S. semiconductor production under the CHIPS and Science Act. Large investment can expand factories, equipment, skills and supplier networks. It does not guarantee that projects reach production on schedule, that yields and product ranges meet buyers’ needs, or that domestic suppliers can replace foreign inputs across the chain.
The Commission also recorded analysts Dan Kim and John VerWey describing assumptions behind some targets as “highly questionable” and projections as “highly optimistic.” The practical point is that investment commitments and policy goals indicate direction and scale of effort; they are not measurements of completed self-sufficiency.
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What China’s next policy target does—and does not—say
Xinhua reported on March 5, 2026, that the draft 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026–2030 calls for “decisive breakthroughs across full chains in integrated circuits.” This signals continued emphasis on the entire semiconductor value chain. The reported statement gives no new numeric 40% semiconductor deadline, so it cannot be treated as confirmation of a new whole-market target or as evidence that the earlier figure has been met.
How to judge the countdown
To assess a future claim that China has reached 40%, check what the percentage actually covers:
- Denominator: all chips consumed in China, or only a defined category?
- Domestic rule: fabricated in China, made by Chinese-owned firms, or either?
- Value-chain stage: chip design, wafer fabrication, packaging and testing, materials, or equipment?
- Metric: capacity, actual production, domestic market share, or self-sufficiency?
- Timing: a measured result for a stated year, or a projection made before the period ended?
On the best comparable whole-market estimate available here, China was at 16.6% in 2020; the later figure of about 30% was a projection for local sourcing by the end of 2025. Separate capacity and output data show rapid growth, especially in mature and foundational chips, but they do not establish that whole-market 40% has been reached. China may be nearing that level in selected segments; the evidence does not show 40% semiconductor self-sufficiency across its market.
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