Computer Weekly reported that Alice Perkins was alerted to concerns about Horizon soon after she became Post Office Ltd’s chair in July 2011. The report says an Ernst & Young auditor raised doubts about the system’s data capture and relayed claims from subpostmasters, but Perkins said she understood the warning as an audit issue rather than a problem with Horizon’s operation in branches. “Day one” therefore means the start of her chairmanship—not the beginning of Horizon or the wider scandal.
What Perkins was told after taking the chair
Perkins became chair of Post Office Ltd in July 2011 and held the role for about four years, according to Computer Weekly’s report on her inquiry evidence. Soon after joining, she met Angus Grant, an Ernst & Young auditor. Computer Weekly reported that Grant warned her Horizon was a risk, that there were concerns about whether it captured data correctly, and that subpostmasters accused of shortfalls were claiming the system was at fault.
Perkins’s notes of the meeting, as described by Computer Weekly, also recorded that the Post Office had negotiated hard with Fujitsu on price but had accepted less in quality assurance. The concerns were therefore not simply about an abstract IT system: the report connects them to allegations from branch operators and to questions about the reliability of data used in accounting.
Why the warning did not register as a branch-level problem
Computer Weekly reported that Perkins said she understood Grant’s warning as relating to whether auditors could audit the accounts, not to Horizon’s operation in branches. She said in hindsight that she could now see the connection and had not given the warning enough weight at the time.
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That distinction is central to interpreting the evidence. The report describes a warning reaching the chair and a later account that she did not then connect it to subpostmasters’ claims. It does not establish that she understood the full implications of those claims when Grant spoke to her.
What the 2012 board minutes reportedly showed
Computer Weekly reported that minutes shown during Perkins’s evidence recorded that, after meeting MP James Arbuthnot, she hoped to convince him and other MPs that Horizon was not at fault. The same report said Perkins responded that she could not recall what she had been thinking then, but that she had intended for the Post Office to take a proper look at the issue.
The minutes and her explanation point to a tension between the public reassurance recorded in the minutes and her stated intention to investigate. They are relevant evidence about how the concerns were handled; by themselves, they do not settle what steps were taken or establish a final judgment about her personal responsibility.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What “failed to act” means—and what it does not establish
“Failed to act” is the headline’s evaluative description, not a finding that can be attributed to the inquiry on the evidence described here. The independent Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry, chaired by Sir Wyn Williams, examines Horizon’s implementation and failings, the Post Office’s use of Horizon information in action against people accused of shortfalls, governance and whistleblowing, lessons and cultural change, and delivery of redress commitments.
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The inquiry was established as a non-statutory inquiry on 29 September 2020 and became statutory on 1 June 2021. Its official evidence listing records a witness statement from Perkins dated 5 June 2024. The detailed account of the meeting with Grant and the 2012 minutes summarized above comes from Computer Weekly’s contemporaneous report of her evidence. The evidence discussed here supports saying that concerns were raised with Perkins early in her tenure and that she later acknowledged not giving them enough weight; it does not, on its own, establish a final inquiry finding on her personal responsibility.
Quick Recap
How to read the evidence
| Evidence or account | What it supports | What it does not prove by itself |
|---|---|---|
| Grant’s reported warning and Perkins’s meeting notes, as described by Computer Weekly | Concerns about Horizon and claims from accused subpostmasters were brought to her attention soon after she became chair. | That she understood the warning at the time as a claim that Horizon was producing inaccurate branch accounts. |
| Perkins’s reported explanation of what she understood | She said she interpreted the issue as one about auditing accounts rather than Horizon’s operation in branches, and later recognized the connection. | That her explanation is itself a final determination of what she should have done. |
| 2012 minutes and Perkins’s reported response | The minutes reportedly recorded a hope to convince MPs Horizon was not at fault; Perkins said she had intended a proper examination. | Which specific investigative steps followed, or a final adjudication of her personal responsibility. |
| The inquiry’s published evidence listing | It records Perkins’s witness statement dated 5 June 2024 and provides an official route to the inquiry’s evidence. | The contents of the statement or a final finding on the claims above. |
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