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Make in India has produced measurable manufacturing activity, but the figures available through 2026 do not establish that the initiative caused it—or that India has gained the global manufacturing role it sought. Vasuki Shastry’s 2024 description of the program as a “qualified failure” is an argument about the gap between its ambition and manufacturing investment, not a settled verdict on every industrial outcome.
What does “qualified failure” mean?
In a September 2024 article published by Scroll, author and researcher Vasuki Shastry called Make in India a “qualified failure.” His central test was whether India had attracted manufacturing investment on a scale commensurate with the initiative’s ambitions. He argued that the country had not made the most of favorable global conditions and that manufacturing remained a weaker destination for foreign investment than some other sectors.
“Qualified” matters: the argument is not that no factories, investment, or new production appeared. Shastry points to high-profile examples, including Apple suppliers making iPhones in India and Micron’s announced assembly-and-test project in Gujarat. His concern is whether such examples translate into broader investment, deeper domestic capabilities and supply chains, and durable gains beyond a limited group of companies.
The evidence since that article adds important context. Government reports record substantial activity under production-linked incentive schemes, and official survey data show growth in registered manufacturing. Those facts complicate a blanket failure verdict, but they do not by themselves show how much activity Make in India caused.
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What the foreign-investment figures do—and do not—show
Shastry’s article reported Make in India Secretariat figures of US$919 billion in cumulative foreign direct investment inflows from 2000 through 2023, including about US$595 billion in the nine-year period he associated with the Modi era. Those are total inflows across sectors, not a measure of manufacturing investment alone.
For FY2022-23, the article cited government data showing the distribution of FDI equity inflows among leading sectors. The figures indicate where equity inflows went in that year; they are not manufacturing’s share of all investment over the initiative’s full life.
| Measure | Reported figure | Source and scope |
|---|---|---|
| Top sector shares of FDI equity inflows, FY2022-23 | Services 16%; computer software and hardware 15%; trading 6%; telecommunications 6%; automobiles 5% | Government sector data, as reported by Scroll in 2024. Shares refer to FDI equity inflows for FY2022-23. |
| Total FDI inflows, 2019–2023 | About US$240 billion | UN Trade and Development figures, as reported by Scroll in 2024; a different period and data series from the cumulative Secretariat total. |
| Total FDI inflows in 2023 | US$28 billion, down 29% year over year | UN Trade and Development figures, as reported by Scroll in 2024. |
| Announced greenfield investment projects, 2020–2023 | About US$200 billion | UN Trade and Development estimate, as reported by Scroll in 2024. Announced projects are not the same as realized investment. |
These numbers should not be collapsed into one trend line: they cover different periods, sources, and types of investment. In particular, an announced greenfield-project value is not proof that the full amount was invested, while aggregate FDI inflows do not isolate manufacturing. The figures help explain Shastry’s concern about investment composition, but they do not alone measure the initiative’s causal impact.
What the PLI figures add
Production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes are a separate, more specific set of industrial programs. Ministry of Commerce and Industry releases report their cumulative investment, production or sales, exports, and employment. These totals provide evidence of activity associated with participating schemes, but they are government-reported program figures—not an independent estimate of what would have happened without the incentives.
| Reporting cut-off | Investment | Production or sales | Exports | Employment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Through November 2024 | Around ₹1.61 lakh crore | About ₹14 lakh crore | Over ₹5.31 lakh crore | More than 11.5 lakh direct and indirect jobs |
| Through FY2024-25 | ₹1.76 lakh crore | ₹16.50 lakh crore | Not stated in the March 2026 parliamentary answer | 12 lakh |
| Through December 31, 2025 | ₹2.16 lakh crore | ₹20.41 lakh crore | Not stated in the March 2026 parliamentary answer | 14.39 lakh |
The Ministry’s March 2025 release also reported 764 approved applications across 14 PLI sectors. The later figures in a March 2026 parliamentary answer use later reporting cut-offs, so the amounts should be read as cumulative totals at different dates, not competing estimates for the same period. The answer does not give export totals for its two later cut-offs; the November 2024 export figure should not be carried forward as though it did.
Investment, sales or production, exports, and employment are distinct measures. A large sales or production total does not say how much value was added in India, how many jobs are permanent or direct, or how much activity is additional because of the incentive. The reported figures document program scale; they are not, on their own, a counterfactual assessment of PLI or Make in India.
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Registered manufacturing grew, but the survey has a defined scope
The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation’s September 30, 2026 release on the Annual Survey of Industries reports that registered manufacturing grew across several measures in FY2024-25 compared with the previous year.
- Output grew 7.81%.
- Gross value added grew 9.59%.
- Total employment grew 7.19%.
- Fixed capital grew 10.54%.
- Estimated persons engaged rose from 1.96 crore in FY2023-24 to 2.10 crore in FY2024-25.
The survey covers registered manufacturing establishments, not the entire economy or every informal manufacturing activity. It shows that surveyed registered industry expanded in FY2024-25; it does not establish that Make in India caused the year’s growth or quantify the initiative’s effect.
Domestic growth is not the same as global manufacturing depth
Output inside India, manufacturing’s contribution to global value added, merchandise exports, and participation in cross-border supply chains answer different questions. The Government of India’s Economic Survey 2025-26 estimates that India accounted for 2.9% of global manufacturing gross value added and 1.8% of global merchandise exports in 2024. It also identifies limited participation in global value chains—especially backward-linked participation involving imported intermediates and components—as a constraint on India’s global manufacturing footprint.
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That distinction helps reconcile apparently conflicting accounts. Domestic production and employment can rise while India remains a relatively small part of global manufacturing and export networks. More goods made locally may be a meaningful result, but it does not automatically mean that domestic suppliers, component ecosystems, or export links have become deep and internationally competitive.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Why analysts say investment may be held back
Shastry lists complex business processes, land acquisition rules, labor regulation, tax complexity, and shortages of technical skills—including welders and engineers—as constraints on manufacturing. The article does not quantify the independent effect of each one, so they are best understood as proposed explanations rather than measured shares of the investment gap.
Shastry also cites former Chief Economic Adviser Arvind Subramanian’s concern that favoring “national champions,” coercive state action such as back-tax disputes, and uncertainty about access to imported inputs can deter investment. Subramanian’s point about inputs is especially relevant to globally integrated manufacturing: firms need confidence that they can obtain materials and components from abroad as well as from domestic suppliers. The argument is not that imported inputs replace local capability, but that restrictions or uncertainty can make a production location less attractive.
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In a September 2024 DBS interview summary, Shastry identified a level playing field without perceived favoritism, stable regulation—especially tax laws—and better political cohesion between central and state governments as improvements that could raise manufacturing value added. These are his policy prescriptions, not independently quantified estimates of how much any one reform would change investment.
How to judge the decade-on record
A useful assessment keeps the outcome and its source in view rather than treating every industrial statistic as proof for or against the slogan.
- For FDI, check the series. Aggregate inflows, sector shares of equity inflows, manufacturing-specific investment, and announced projects are not interchangeable.
- For PLI, check the cut-off and metric. Investment, sales or production, exports, and employment describe different kinds of program activity.
- For industrial growth, check coverage. The FY2024-25 Annual Survey of Industries results concern registered manufacturing establishments.
- For global competitiveness, look beyond domestic output. Global value-added share, merchandise exports, and supply-chain participation show dimensions that production totals alone cannot capture.
- For causation, ask what the comparison is. Reported growth during a program is not the same as evidence that the program produced growth that would otherwise not have occurred.
On the available evidence, Shastry’s “qualified failure” remains a defensible criticism of the gap between ambition and manufacturing investment, especially when the test is global integration and investment composition. It is not the only fair reading: official PLI reporting and the latest registered-industry survey show substantial program activity and recent growth. The evidence establishes neither that Make in India failed across the board nor that it caused the reported gains.
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