Post Office procurement plans allowed for Horizon-related support and transition work to continue until 2033, but that is not a firm deadline or confirmation that the same system will run unchanged in every branch until then. The replacement programme has since slipped: as of August 18, 2026, OneView Commerce was reported as the successful bidder for a new branch electronic point-of-sale (EPOS) system, but the contract had not been signed. Meanwhile, Fujitsu’s support was extended to March 31, 2027.
What does “until 2033” mean?
The 2033 date came from a Post Office procurement exercise reported by Computer Weekly on May 13, 2025. The plans envisaged almost £492 million across two lots: one for support and transition services around the existing Horizon platform, and another for a replacement EPOS system. The replacement contract was planned to last 12 years. Those arrangements made 2033 a possible horizon for support and transition work—not a guaranteed date for Horizon’s shutdown, and not proof it would remain unchanged in every branch until then. Computer Weekly’s report on the procurement describes the original proposal.
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The distinction matters because Horizon, Fujitsu and the branch EPOS function are not interchangeable terms. Horizon is the platform; Fujitsu has been its supplier; and the EPOS replacement is one part of a wider programme to change the technology and services used by branches. A new supplier can take over support while Horizon remains in use, just as a new EPOS system can be introduced before every related service and historical record has been migrated.
What Horizon does—and why it became a scandal
Introduced across the Post Office network around 1999–2000, Horizon automated accounting and branch operations. It connects to services including mail, retail, banking and government transactions. That reach helps explain why replacement is more complicated than installing a new till: the system sits within a web of branch devices, data-centre and back-office services, applications and business processes.
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The scandal was not simply a matter of occasional software defects. The Post Office relied on Horizon data when pursuing subpostmasters who reported unexplained shortfalls. Some were prosecuted, convicted, bankrupted or imprisoned. The statutory inquiry has examined how Horizon failures and institutional decisions led to wrongful suspension, termination and prosecution over more than two decades. Its work also addresses disclosure failures and the evidential weight given to computer-generated records, including questions about Fujitsu personnel’s remote access. The government’s Horizon Inquiry collection provides inquiry material and updates.
It would be too broad to say every reported discrepancy was caused by one software bug. Inquiry evidence and reporting describe a wider technical and organisational environment involving connectivity, related systems, infrastructure, support practices and decisions about how system data was used. A system-generated balance is not, by itself, proof of wrongdoing by a subpostmaster.
What the 2025 procurement set out to buy
The reported procurement divided the work into two lots. Computer Weekly put their values at just under £323 million for Lot 1 and just over £169 million for Lot 2, together almost £492 million. These are reported procurement values, not a complete measure of the lifetime cost of replacing Post Office technology or of the scandal.
| Lot | Purpose | Reported value and term |
|---|---|---|
| Lot 1: replacement services provider | Take over and support existing Horizon services; manage physical and digital infrastructure and data-centre operations; provide application support; continue development and release management; help move services from on-premise data centres to cloud infrastructure; and establish a cloud-native back-office and channel platform. | Just under £323 million, as reported by Computer Weekly. A specific contract term is not stated in the cited report. Source. |
| Lot 2: new EPOS provider | Assess and select a commercial off-the-shelf replacement, adapt it to Post Office requirements, configure and test it, and support rollout across branches. | Just over £169 million, with a planned 12-year contract, as reported by Computer Weekly. Source. |
“Off-the-shelf” does not mean ready to switch on without further work. The selected product still needs configuration, integration with other services, security assurance, testing, data migration and a managed rollout. The government’s Future Technology Portfolio summary business case describes the broader replacement programme.
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Why replacing it can take years
Horizon supports important transactions across a nationwide branch network. A change must protect the accuracy and continuity of services customers and subpostmasters use, while ensuring that old and new records reconcile. A cutover error could produce duplicate or missing transactions, mismatched balances or uncertainty about which record is authoritative. Those risks make a staged, tested transition more credible than a rapid switch, even when continued use of the old platform is unpopular.
The procurement notice said a straightforward supplier handover would be technically disproportionate given Horizon’s complexity and architecture. The official Find a Tender notice explains the stated reason for the bridging arrangement. In practice, a replacement also has to account for branch hardware, connections to banking, mail, retail and government services, and back-office operations. Old and new systems may need to run in parallel while transactions are checked and problems resolved.
There is also a justice and record-keeping dimension. Replacing infrastructure must not make historic transaction data, audit trails or other evidence inaccessible to people investigating discrepancies, pursuing appeals or seeking redress. Modernisation has to preserve the context needed to examine what happened, rather than simply move balances into a new system.
How the timetable has changed
In 2025, Computer Weekly reported that Fujitsu’s contract had been extended to March 2026 under an arrangement worth about £40 million. That was followed by a further one-year bridge because the replacement-services procurement and mobilisation could not be completed in time. Official procurement material records the extension as running from April 1, 2026, to March 31, 2027; the Post Office confirmed its value as £41 million excluding VAT. The Post Office’s FOI response confirms the value.
The bridge keeps services running while a new provider is prepared. It does not mean Fujitsu remains the intended long-term supplier, nor does it mean Horizon has already been replaced. The government’s description of a phased exit from current Fujitsu contract arrangements likewise points to a transition rather than an instantaneous departure.
As of August 18, 2026, Computer Weekly reported OneView Commerce as the successful bidder for the new EPOS system, but said the contract remained unsigned after six extensions to the standstill period. The latest reported extension ran to August 21, making August 22 the earliest possible signing date at the time of that report. A losing bidder was reportedly challenging the award; that status is based on the reporting, not an independently confirmed legal finding. The latest reported delay does not establish that OneView has begun a full branch rollout.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What current reports say about branch problems
Computer Weekly reported survey results in which 57% of current subpostmasters said they had experienced unexplained shortfalls, 92% had encountered a Horizon-related issue in the preceding 12 months, and three-quarters said they had used their own money to cover discrepancies or resolved problems themselves. Screen freezes and lost connectivity were among the reported problems. These are survey responses about reported experiences, not proof that every incident was caused by Horizon software. The report also described a planned independent review of the current system’s integrity and its ability to identify discrepancies; it does not establish the review’s final findings.
What a trustworthy replacement needs to prove
A new platform’s success should be judged by more than its launch date or supplier. For subpostmasters, the important question is whether its technical controls and the organisation’s procedures make discrepancies understandable, reviewable and fairly handled.
- Auditable records: transaction histories and changes should be accessible and capable of independent examination.
- Human review: a computer-generated shortfall should prompt investigation, not an automatic assumption of misconduct.
- Controlled remote access: support access should be strictly governed, logged and independently reviewable.
- Resilience: branches need safe ways to handle connectivity loss or degraded service without creating incomplete or duplicated records.
- Safe migration: old and new ledgers must reconcile, with transaction identifiers, timestamps and audit context preserved.
- Independent assurance: security, accuracy and operational performance should be tested in ways that do not depend solely on the supplier’s own account.
- Usable support: helpdesk processes should treat a discrepancy as a possible system or process incident to investigate.
- Evidence preservation: historic records must remain available for appeals, redress and scrutiny.
These safeguards involve real trade-offs. Parallel running can improve confidence but adds cost and complexity; a fast Fujitsu exit may answer accountability concerns but create continuity risks; cloud infrastructure can support modernisation while increasing reliance on architecture, connectivity and supplier governance. The objective is not to preserve the old system indefinitely, but to replace it without creating fresh operational or evidential failures.
Why the technology transition is not the end of the scandal
A replacement can change future branch operations; it cannot undo wrongful convictions or settle compensation claims by itself. The statutory inquiry, criminal reviews, redress and implementation of inquiry recommendations remain part of the story. The Horizon Shortfall Scheme closed to new applications on January 31, 2026, although existing applications continued to be processed, according to the Post Office’s redress FAQ. Government responses and recommendation tracking are available through the Horizon Inquiry recommendations page and the government response to Volume 1.
That continuing work also makes evidence retention a practical requirement of the replacement programme. The public should not confuse a new EPOS system, a new support provider or Fujitsu’s eventual exit with the completion of redress or accountability. A joint government, Fujitsu and Post Office statement on restorative justice addresses that separate responsibility.
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