Europe’s concern is strategic exposure, not proof that US technology providers are unsafe or will cut off service. Non-EU suppliers underpin significant parts of the region’s digital ecosystem, and US firms are particularly prominent in software and cloud. That concentration can limit Europe’s choices and leave critical services more exposed to decisions, laws and supply chains outside its control.
What Europe means by technological sovereignty
The European Commission defines it this way: “Tech sovereignty is Europe’s ability to act independently in the digital world by developing and controlling key technologies, data, and infrastructure, while reducing reliance on non-EU providers.” The definition is about having capacity and choice, not shutting out every foreign supplier.
That distinction matters because sovereignty is broader than where data is stored. It can also involve who owns and controls a provider, how independent it is from third countries, whether its software supply chain is transparent, and how sensitive the service or workload is. A service hosted in Europe is not automatically independent in every one of those respects.
Where the dependencies—and the stakes—are
The issue spans software, cloud computing, semiconductors, AI hardware and services, cybersecurity, and the supply chains behind critical infrastructure. A 2025 European Parliament-commissioned study, released by the EU Publications Office on 6 January 2026, says Europe remains heavily dependent on non-EU software and cloud providers, primarily US firms, and maps related geopolitical and economic risks.
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The Commission reports that more than 80% of key digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property rely on non-EU countries. That is an aggregate measure of dependence on countries outside the EU; it is not a measure of the US share. The Commission also identifies cloud, cybersecurity and other strategic technologies as areas where dependencies remain significant.
Concentration in critical services can mean that important European organizations rely on decisions, legal environments and supply chains beyond European control. The official materials establish this as a resilience concern; they do not establish that a particular provider will suspend service or that political coercion is inevitable. Nor does a provider’s US origin alone demonstrate that it is unsafe.
What the figures say about capacity and demand
The Commission’s 2026 State of the Digital Decade package presents a picture of both rising technology use and limited domestic capacity. These figures have different scopes: semiconductor market share measures industrial position, while enterprise figures measure adoption, not the origin of the tools being used.
| Measure | Reported figure | What it indicates |
|---|---|---|
| EU share of the global semiconductor market | 9%; the EU target for 2030 is 20% | The EU remains below its stated target. The 20% figure is a target, not a current share. |
| EU enterprises using cloud computing | 46.7% | Cloud is already in use by a substantial share of enterprises; the figure does not identify providers’ home countries. |
| EU enterprises using data analytics | 39.9% | Data analytics is also in use across a substantial share of enterprises. |
| EU enterprises deploying AI | Nearly 20% | AI deployment is growing, but the reported figure does not measure EU ownership of AI systems or infrastructure. |
| Europeans who favour reducing dependence on non-EU suppliers | 82% | The Commission cites this finding from the 2026 Special Eurobarometer. |
| Europeans supporting investment in EU-developed digital infrastructure | 85% | The Commission cites this finding from the 2026 Special Eurobarometer. |
| Europeans who consider digital policy a key EU priority | 79% | The Commission cites this finding from the 2026 Special Eurobarometer. |
The Commission also reports that the EU’s 27 national roadmaps committed €289.3 billion across 1,934 measures, including €205.9 billion from public budgets—about 1.09% of EU GDP. These are commitments recorded in roadmaps, not evidence that all the money has been spent.
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What the EU is proposing—and what is not yet in place
On 3 June 2026, the Commission presented a technological sovereignty package that included proposals for Chips Act 2.0 and a Cloud and AI Development Act, an EU Open Source Strategy, and a roadmap for digitalisation and AI in energy. The wider agenda also includes AI capacity, skills, data access, cybersecurity, connectivity and startup growth. Proposals and policy targets describe intended action; they should not be confused with completed capacity.
Cloud and data-centre capacity
The Cloud and AI Development Act is a proposal to improve conditions for sustainable cloud and data-centre deployment, support research and innovation, and expand capacity. It sets a proposed goal of at least tripling EU data-centre capacity within five to seven years. The Commission points to long permitting procedures and constraints involving energy, land and financing as obstacles to expansion.
Public-sector assurance levels
The proposal sets out four levels for public-sector risk assessment. The levels offer a more useful way to think about sovereignty than a simple European-versus-foreign label:
| Level | Assurance described by the Commission |
|---|---|
| 1 | Data is processed and stored in infrastructure located in the EU. |
| 2 | The provider demonstrates independence from third countries and transparency over the software supply chain. |
| 3 | The provider is owned and controlled from the EU and meets additional criteria. The Commission says it can recognize third-country providers. |
| 4 | Full transparency and control over the software supply chain, with no third-country interference. |
For a purchaser, the framework points to distinct questions: where the data is processed, how independent the provider is, who owns and controls it, how visible its software supply chain is, and how sensitive the workload would be if service were disrupted or access constrained.
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Procurement and the market
The proposal would create a common EU-level procurement framework for public administrations, promote EU added value and open-source solutions, and keep the vast majority of the market open to partners. That stated aim signals that the policy is intended to reduce strategic exposure and widen choice, not to replace every non-EU supplier or divide the technology market into closed blocs.
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Policy targets do not translate automatically into available infrastructure. In its 2026 monitoring, the Commission identifies market fragmentation, uneven implementation among member states, limited testing and innovation capacity, pressure on computing capacity, shortages in digital skills and the need for sustained investment as continuing challenges. Its Cloud and AI proposal also highlights permitting, energy, land and financing constraints.
Supply chains add another complication: a European provider may reduce some jurisdictional or concentration risks while still depending on non-European chips, software, energy, financing or other upstream inputs. A change in a provider’s location alone therefore cannot establish that the entire service is independent of external dependencies.
What the concern means for Europe’s economy
For governments and organizations that depend on critical digital services, the policy question is how to preserve continuity and room to act if a supplier, market or supply chain becomes unavailable or less dependable. More provider choice, local capacity and better visibility into dependencies can contribute to resilience, but the Commission’s own account of implementation barriers shows why that capacity takes time and investment.
For the wider economy, the debate involves a tradeoff: building capacity and resilience while retaining access to global suppliers, expertise and markets. The Commission’s proposal explicitly aims to leave most of the market open to partners. The central issue is not whether Europe should use US technology at all, but whether it can make informed choices and maintain workable alternatives for services it considers critical.
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