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Hart InterCivic and Microsoft announced a partnership on June 3, 2021, to integrate Microsoft’s ElectionGuard software into Hart’s Verity voting systems. The idea was to let voters receive a confirmation code after scanning a paper ballot and later check whether an encrypted version of that ballot appeared in the election record—without revealing their choices. The partnership led to a live pilot in one Franklin County, Idaho, precinct on November 8, 2022. The pilot demonstrated a voter-facing verification process and matching counts at small scale, not a replacement for paper ballots, audits, or other election safeguards.
What Hart and Microsoft announced
On June 3, 2021, Hart InterCivic and Microsoft announced that Hart would incorporate Microsoft’s open-source ElectionGuard software into its Verity voting systems. Hart and Microsoft described Hart as the first major U.S. voting-machine manufacturer to offer this kind of voter-facing end-to-end verifiability; that “first” characterization was the companies’ claim. Hart’s announcement said a voter would receive a verification code after scanning a ballot and that outside parties could check published election data.
The announcement was a plan, not evidence that every Hart system or jurisdiction would use ElectionGuard. Its significance became clearer with a real-election pilot the following year.
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ElectionGuard, in plain English
ElectionGuard is an open-source software development kit (SDK) for adding end-to-end verifiability to election systems. It is not a voting machine, ballot-marking device, or complete election system. It is designed to work alongside a voting system and paper ballots, producing encrypted ballot records and data that voters and outside verifiers can check. The ElectionGuard project describes it as software for election vendors and organizations conducting and publishing post-election audits.
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In the Hart workflow, the scanner creates an encrypted representation of a ballot and associates it with a confirmation code. A voter can later look up the code to check whether that encrypted ballot appears in the published record. The code is not meant to reveal the voter’s selections or serve as proof of how the person voted.
The underlying system uses homomorphic encryption: in simplified terms, encrypted votes can be combined mathematically to calculate a tally without first exposing each voter’s choices. Verifiers can examine the election record and check that the tally follows from the encrypted ballots. The project’s code and documentation describe the software components and verification artifacts.
How the voter workflow worked
- Mark and review a paper ballot. The voter marks a ballot by hand or with a ballot-marking device, then reviews it.
- Scan the ballot. The voter inserts it into the Hart Verity scanner.
- Receive a code. The ElectionGuard-integrated process encrypts the ballot and provides a printed confirmation code.
- Check the published record later. The voter can look up the code to see whether the corresponding encrypted ballot was included in the election record.
- Allow independent checking. A third party can use published election artifacts to check the record and tally calculations.
A successful lookup is evidence of inclusion in the published record. It does not establish that the ballot was marked as the voter intended, that no error occurred before scanning, or that every election procedure was followed correctly. Because ordinary cast ballots stay encrypted, the code is not a receipt that shows the selections—a distinction that also helps prevent it from becoming transferable proof for vote-buying or coercion.
What happened in the Idaho pilot
On November 8, 2022, Hart and its partners tested the integration in one precinct serving the Preston District #4 area of Franklin County, Idaho. Voters could choose the Hart Verity scanner with ElectionGuard or use the county’s usual ballot-deposit process. According to the pilot report, 111 ballots—almost half of the precinct’s voters—used the ElectionGuard option.
The pilot generated confirmation codes and published an election record that voters and other parties could check. The report says Hart’s ordinary tabulation, the ElectionGuard tabulation, and a manual hand count matched. It also reports that MITRE independently verified the results. These findings apply to this pilot’s ballots and procedures; they are not a nationwide performance guarantee or evidence of large-scale deployment.
The setup was not internet voting. The election workflow ran on an isolated local network; the confirmation-code lookup site was separate from the voting and tally environment. The distinction matters: a web page used after an election to check a code is not the same as casting a ballot online.
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What the system can—and cannot—show
ElectionGuard is intended to add evidence about whether encrypted ballots appear in the published record, whether the tally is consistent with those ballots, and whether relevant calculations can be checked by outside verifiers. That improves transparency: a voter need not rely only on a vendor or election office’s assertion that a ballot was counted.
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The pilot report calls end-to-end verifiability an additional tool, not a silver bullet. ElectionGuard supplements paper ballots, logic-and-accuracy testing, audits, hash validation, observers, and other controls; it does not replace them. A risk-limiting audit, for example, uses evidence from paper ballots to check whether a reported outcome is correct. That is related to election assurance but is not the same as a voter checking an encrypted ballot’s inclusion code.
Operational lessons from the pilot
Putting cryptographic software into an election required more than adding code to a scanner. The pilot report describes practical work to accommodate local rules, equipment recovery, ballot handling, key custody, and voter communication.
- Rescans: Confirmation codes needed to remain repeatable when a ballot was rescanned after a hardware problem. Otherwise, ordinary recovery could create uncertainty or duplicate records.
- Overvotes: The initial SDK behavior did not cover every jurisdiction’s overvote practice. Hart and Microsoft adapted the implementation for local handling.
- Spoiled and challenged ballots: These were treated differently from cast ballots. The pilot could display selections from a spoiled ballot in decrypted form, while ordinary cast ballots remained encrypted.
- Keys and recovery: Guardian private keys were treated as sensitive. The report describes offline devices, controlled storage, and removable-media recovery copies. That reduces some exposure but creates responsibilities around custody, loss, device failure, and recovery ceremonies.
- Usability: Voters and poll workers need to understand what the code does—and what it does not do. A confusing interface or explanation can undermine confidence rather than build it.
These are not incidental details. A jurisdiction would need procedures for rescans and recounts, key generation and recovery, accessible voting, public record publication, poll-worker training, and compatibility with its election law and equipment.
What is current—and what is not established
As of August 2026, ElectionGuard’s official site describes the project as open source, MIT-licensed, and available without a software-use fee. “Free software” does not mean a free deployment: integration, certification, security review, hardware, hosting, training, support, and election administration all carry costs.
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Hart’s system certification history should be kept separate from ElectionGuard availability. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission lists Verity Voting 2.8 as certified on May 22, 2026, under VVSG 1.0, and lists Verity Vanguard 1.1 as certified under VVSG 2.0 on June 26, 2026. Those records concern Hart products; they do not establish that the Idaho pilot’s ElectionGuard integration is included in every current Hart system or deployment. Officials should confirm the exact product, software version, jurisdictional approval, and configuration with the vendor and relevant authorities.
What a jurisdiction should evaluate
For election officials, ElectionGuard is a procurement and operations decision, not a consumer product. Before considering deployment, a jurisdiction would need to establish that the exact hardware-and-software combination is approved for use and assess:
- Compatibility with its ballot styles, voting methods, accessibility needs, and overvote rules.
- How hand-marked and machine-marked paper ballots are handled, including rescans, recounts, equipment failure, and duplicate-scan prevention.
- Key-generation ceremonies, guardian custody, offline storage, backup, disaster recovery, and accountability.
- How election records and confirmation-code services will be published, hosted, retained, and independently checked.
- Whether the system fits existing audits, chain-of-custody controls, and local law.
- Poll-worker training, voter explanations, vendor support, and long-term maintenance.
- Whether ElectionGuard is included, optional, or separately implemented in the specific certified configuration.
The 2022 pilot report itself identifies the need for more testing across different jurisdictions, larger elections, vote-by-mail, and other voting technologies. A one-precinct demonstration is meaningful evidence of feasibility, but it cannot answer every scaling, usability, or operational question.
Why the partnership mattered
The Hart–Microsoft partnership moved voter-facing cryptographic verification from a software concept into a live, paper-based election pilot. Its clearest contribution was a way for an individual voter to check ballot inclusion while giving outside verifiers material to examine the tally. Its limits are equally important: the voter cannot verify selections through the code, the cryptographic layer does not secure every part of election administration, and the pilot was small. The evidence supports describing ElectionGuard as an additional transparency and verification tool—not as a guarantee of election security or a universal feature of Hart voting systems.
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